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It was 8th October 2005, when at
8:50 AM a massive 7.6-scale
earthquake struck northern Pakistan
causing grave destruction in KP and
AJK. The affected area covering
32,000 square kilometers lies in a
rough mountainous Himalayan terrain.
It affected over 4,000 villages and
killed more than 73,000 people.
Around 600,000 houses were smashed
and 3.3 million people rendered
homeless.
Trauma-ridden survivors were exposed
to a number of plights such as
homelessness, the ruthless winter,
scarcity of food, physical and
mental injuries, and above all
paralyzed state machinery.
Quick media coverage of the disaster
led to an exceptional response from
every nook and corner of the world.
The Government of Pakistan with the
help of international partners and
civil society started relief work
and announced the creation of a
Federal Relief Commission. The
mandate of the Commission was to
coordinate relief activities with
national and international players
comprising of not less than 85
bilateral and multilateral donors.
The earthquake brought unprecedented
destruction and the Government of
Pakistan found itself incapacitated
to handle it. As a result a state of
emergency was imposed to allow the
United Nations Disaster Assessment
and Coordination (UNDAC) team to
come and play its part. The UNDAC
team arrived on 9th October and
started negotiating the
institutional design of a
coordinated humanitarian response
with the Government of Pakistan.
After purposeful discussions the
cluster approach was agreed upon and
the Government of Pakistan nominated
its officials as co-chairs of
various humanitarian clusters, drawn
from the cadre deployed to the
Federal Relief Commission.
The humanitarian clusters, generally
attended by UN agency and NGO
representatives at the Federal
level, worked like open forums at
the local level where the affected
population could also come and take
part in deliberations. This approach
gave birth to a culture of
stakeholder consultation and
contribution which later on became
the foundation of reconstruction and
rehabilitation strategies.
One of the instant challenges was
the provision of shelter to affected
people so as to save them from
cold-induced diseases ready to take
them on for another round of deaths.
The response to the shelter
challenge was immense even then 80
per cent of the tents could not
offer right kind of safety from the
deadly cold. The arrangement and
distribution of insulation material
on such a large scale that too
within a very short span of time was
not less than a wild goose chase.
Heating solutions were out of the
question as they posed a serious
risk of fire.
Therefore a transitional shelter
strategy was geared up based on two
elements: distribution of corrugated
galvanized iron sheets along with
construction tools and mobilization
of the affected people to recover
construction materials from the
wreckage of their shattered houses.
This in fact was the point from
where an owner-driven recovery
strategy originated whereby
households under the technical
guidance of shelter cluster members,
were to construct their shelters on
their own. This strategy was also
endorsed by the Federal Relief
Commission, which activated army
troops, particularly the Corps of
Engineers, to distribute sheets and
instruct people. One reason for
adoption of this strategy at policy
level was that the same galvanized
sheets would later be used in
permanent reconstruction.
In addition to the shelter
materials, the Government also
provided Rs 25, 000 to each
household as a cash grant to meet
the terms of their immediate shelter
requirements.
The exact number of transitional
shelters built remains unidentified
because of the involvement of
countless individuals and
organizations. However the fact that
people neither died of cold nor
shifted to warmer areas, reveals
that shelter coverage was up to the
mark.
The success of this strategy
convinced policy makers that the
earthquake affected people could
play a key role in the
reconstruction process by virtue of
both their ingenuity and
productivity. By constructing safe
and sound transitional shelters from
galvanized sheets and the rubble of
houses with minimal guidance, the
earthquake victims also invalidated
the attitude that construction
technology is ‘highly technical’.
NGOs too displayed their capability
in providing technical support to
people in making their houses
earthquake resistant. All these
findings were instrumental in
boosting the confidence of
stakeholders and motivating them to
go for an owner-driven approach in
housing reconstruction.
On the basis of an exercise on
“Damages and Needs Assessment”, the
World Bank and Asian Development
Bank reported at the Donors’
Conference held on 19th November
2005, that $5.2 billion were
required for earthquake relief,
early recovery and reconstruction in
KP and AJK. An additional amount of
$30 million was anticipated as the
requirement for technical assistance
and capacity building.
In November 2005, the Government of
Pakistan established the Earthquake
Reconstruction and Rehabilitation
Authority (ERRA) at the federal
level with counterparts; the
Provincial Earthquake Reconstruction
and Rehabilitation Authority (PERRA)
and the State Earthquake
Reconstruction and Rehabilitation
Authority (SERRA) in KP and AJK,
respectively. District
Reconstruction Units (DRUs) were
created at district level.
ERRA’s main role is macro planning,
developing selected strategies,
financing, project approval and
monitoring and evaluation.
Additionally, it ensures the
required coordination and provides
facilitation to implementing
partners, whereas physical
implementation of the projects is
the responsibility of respective
governments.
ERRA started compiling a number of
sector strategies. To provide
technical support to these
strategies technical working groups
were formed. Most of the
humanitarian clusters included
themselves into these groups and the
process of consultation started.
Initial deliberations reflected that
ERRA would implement and regulate
reconstruction directly, through
District Reconstruction Units (DRUs)
which involved political and legal
sensitivities. This led to the
creation of a compound governance
structure in which the ERRA Council
was created at the federal level,
headed by the Prime Minister and
comprising senior representatives
from the legislature and executive
branch of the federal and regional
governments, as well as some members
from civil society. Similarly, SERRA
and PERRA councils were created at
state and provincial levels, for AJK
and KP, respectively. These bodies
were meant to provide strategic
guidance and to hold ERRA and its
regional counterparts accountable
through periodic meetings.
At the district level District
Reconstruction Advisory Committees (DRAC)
with the power to approve projects,
were created to act as governing
bodies of the DRUs. The DRAC was
headed by the district Nazim (mayor)
or Deputy Commissioner as the case
may be. Representatives from
district government departments and
some NGOs formed the DRAC members.
ERRA prepared sixteen strategies:
thirteen sectoral and three
thematic. Of these, the housing
strategy was the most important as
$220 million out of $870 million
committed to the Government of
Pakistan by World Bank, were
allocated for housing recovery only.
Besides World Bank, UN-Habitat, the
National Society for Earthquake
Technology (NSET) from Nepal and the
National Engineering Services of
Pakistan (NESPAK), were the
significant partners.
Owner-driven approach for housing
was unanimously agreed upon by all
but so far as the choice of
technology, implementation
mechanisms, and prescribed designs
are concerned there were serious
preliminary differences. The World
Bank insisted on certain designs
based on reinforced concrete
elements. Whereas UN-Habitat and
NSET argued that it will be very
difficult to train local masons in
correct practice of modern
technology and incorrectly
constructed concrete buildings could
turn out to be more deadly in case
of an earthquake.
After a series of deliberations, it
was decided to incorporate risk
reduction elements into customary
construction techniques, rather than
adhering to specific designs.
The policy decision to separate the
rural and urban housing strategies
was also taken: ‘rural housing’ as
an independent strategy, while urban
housing as a part of urban
development strategy that covered
town planning, restoration of
municipal services, hazard zoning
etc. The underlying principle for
this division was the intricate and
interconnected challenges of town
planning, provision of urban
services and infrastructure, and
repositioning of people from the
risky areas.
The two documents: damages and needs
assessment report (Asian Development
Bank and World Bank, 2005) and UN
early recovery framework (United
Nations, 2005) that were presented
at a donors’ 2005, prescribed
guiding principles for rural
housing. Salient among them were:
building on existing local knowledge
and capacities, and restoring the
livelihoods of affected people.
The rural housing strategy was
adopted and published by ERRA in
April 2006, which assured
consistency of support to the
households without considering their
pre-earthquake condition. Two broad
based categories were defined on the
basis of the nature of damage. These
were structurally damaged houses
beyond repair and structurally
damaged houses within repair.
An amount of Rs175, 000 (including
initial grant in advance of Rs25,
000) were sanctioned for every
destroyed house sanctioned per house
with a condition that it would be
paid in installments upon completion
of various stages of construction.
In case of partially destroyed
houses, a sum of Rs50, 000 (in
addition to initially disbursed
Rs25,000) was approved.
A large number of technical
extension and inspection workers
were utilized for house-to-house
visits to assess the damage, provide
technical advice, inspect the
progress and quality of
reconstruction and approve
disbursement of financial
installments. Earthquake resistant
construction standards were
formulated and communicated to the
general public. Construction workers
were trained accordingly and a
system to redress grievances was
worked out. Inflationary pressure on
construction materials was also
taken into account besides
reassuring its smooth and affordable
supply chain.
World Bank being the major donor was
pivotal in demarcation of the
standard of construction and the
assessment and inspection model.
However after a number of
discussions, the rural housing by
and large was divided among Pakistan
Army and the Pakistan Poverty
Alleviation Fund (PPAF) – a national
NGO involved in mostly World Bank
funded community development
projects. The work of both
organizations was managed by ERRA’s
rural housing strategy.
The Pakistan Army was joined Swiss
Agency for Development Corporation (SDC)
and UN-Habitat as the principal
technical advisors. Under this
arrangement, ERRA called for the
expressions of interest from various
organizations to work as partners
for provision of technical
assistance to the affected
households and a number of national
and international NGOs joined hands.
A Union Council, with a population
of 100 to 500 households was the
smallest entity to be taken care of
by one partner. The Union Councils
without a partner were to be looked
after by the army teams.
On similar lines, the Pakistan
Poverty Alleviation Fund (PPAF)
engaged its long-standing partner
NGOs. The criteria for selection of
partner organizations was the
established technical capability,
experience in social mobilization,
ability to manage sizable financial
resources and preferably, prior
presence in the area.
Moderated by the experts of two
international partners, Emergency
Architects (France) and the National
Society for Earthquake Technology (NSET,
Nepal), and a national NGO,
Strengthening Participatory
Organizations (SPO), wide-ranging
training of trainers workshops were
organized for the personnel of
partner organizations. Later on
another national NGO, the Rural
Support Program Network (RSPN) was
also made available to provide
training in social mobilization.
More than 700,000 sessions of
training had been observed by the
last quarter of 2008.
The rural housing has been has
almost come to an end and has won
United Nations Sasakawa Award for
outstanding achievements.
After the earthquake, a geotechnical
investigation sponsored by the
Government of Japan was undertaken
particularly in urban areas to
earmark the suitable sites for
permanent reconstruction on basis of
the strength of the soil and
geological patterns beneath. To make
this zoning more comprehensive
through subsequent mapping, ERRA
contracted a Pakistani engineering
firm as well. Soon after this, ERRA
concluded and published its urban
housing strategy on 30th July 2007.
The three main priorities were; a
better forward-looking town
planning, linking social services to
housing, and owner-driven
reconstruction. The level and
mechanism of housing reconstruction
subsidy was same as it was for rural
housing, with an exception that the
whole grant was transferred at once.
Unlike rural housing the urban
housing could not become the land
mark of the process of
reconstruction and rehabilitation
mainly because of following reasons:
1. The task of ensuring earthquake
resistant construction was left to
the municipal authorities who were
neither capable nor strong to
enforce the earthquake construction
codes. Moreover no training or
information program was launched to
fulfill the divergent needs of urban
housing reconstruction.2. Relocation problem was a real
testing one. For instance Balakot
town of District Mansehra (KP) was
declared unfit for reconstruction as
it is situated at convergence of
three fault lines. So a “New Balakot”,
some 20 Kilometers away from “Old
Balakot” was selected to be the new
home town. This decision was not
acceptable to the poor inhabitants
of area who were apprehensive of the
fact that by shifting from transit
point of scenic valleys to a off the
rout place might ruin their tourism
based economy. Same problem was
faced in urban centers of
Muzaffarabad, Bagh and Rawalakot.
3. The issues of tenure were far
more complicated in urban areas as
compared to the rural one. Many
affected people had rented house and
many lived in multi-story with
different owners on different
floors.
4. Unlike rural areas the heaps of
rubble were so overwhelming that
their removal was outside the
physical or financial reach of
inhabitants.
5. Unlike rural areas people could
not find fields, mountains, forests,
wasteland etc in urban areas for
erecting shelters because of a very
limited available space.
6. Distribution of prefabricated
two-room shelters received from
Government of Saudia Arabia in 2006,
which negated the owner-driven
approach the Key factor of user
participation in design or
construction was missing.
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